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“Don't you even remember that?” asks the manipulatively doubting husband played by Charles 
Boyer in Gaslight (1944).  “Yes, of course, I do,” answers his wife, played by Ingrid Bergman.  
“But suddenly,” she immediately clarifies, “I am beginning not to trust my memory at all.”  Does 
she remember what happened to that broach?  Though her memory is intact psychologically, it 
has begun epistemically to fail her.  An epistemological theory of memory ought to explain this 
distinction: how one can lose touch with one’s memory in a way that does not involve amnesia 
or dementia.  Since the 2016 elections ‘gaslighting’ has served as a political diagnosis; earlier it 
more generally marked a form of emotional abuse.  But Gaslight appears to reveal an important 
link between memory and testimony: one treats one’s memory as a source of epistemic warrant 
only insofar as one can get relevant others to acknowledge it as capable of providing warrant 
through testimony.  I’ll argue that this formula captures only part, and not the deepest part, of the 
link between memory and testimony.  But the film vividly depicts how the epistemic faculty of 
memory puts us all at the mercy of at least some potential interlocutors.  If they do not believe 
us, we may lose a feel for how to ‘believe ourselves.’ 
The film shows us how the link may emerge in practice.  How does it emerge in theory?  
We can begin from the popular idea that memory resembles testimony insofar as each does not 
 
1 Forthcoming in Sanford Goldberg and Stephen Wright (eds), Testimony and Memory: New 
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generate but ‘preserves’ epistemic warrant.2  My question is how such ‘preservation’ does its 
epistemic work – and whether the idea (or metaphor) of preservation captures how it works.  
Theories of testimony that emphasize something like preservation generically divide into those 
that do and those that do not emphasize an interpersonal relation between testifier and addressee.  
Should we stop at minimal non-reductionism, at the claim that the testimonial warrant 
‘preserved’ from testifier to address does not reduce to other sources of warrant, or should we go 
further and explain it as partly grounded in the interpersonal relation wherein the speaker 
addresses her audience?  The latter approach, distinctive of an ‘assurance theory,’ draws a key 
distinction between how the addressee can get warrant from being thus addressed and how a 
non-addressed overhearer can get warrant from merely witnessing the speech act, a distinction 
that more minimal non-reductionists reject.  The approach is distinctive in its emphasis on the 
epistemic significance of how the testifier invites the addressee’s trust, an invitation that she does 
not extend to overhearers.  I have defended an assurance theory of testimonial warrant in other 
work.3  Here I’ll develop an assurance theory in the epistemology of memory. 
How could the ‘preservation’ of warrant through memory involve an assurance?  What 
would even count as an intrapersonal assurance?  On an assurance-theoretic approach, we can 
understand the relation that ‘preserves’ warrant by contrasting it with a relation that has gone 
pathological in specific respects.  An assurance-theoretic approach to testimony explains the 
 
2 For some canonical formulations, see Tyler Burge, “Content Preservation,” Philosophical 
Review 102:4 (1993); Michael Dummett, “Testimony and Memory,” in A. Chakrabarti and B. K. Matilal, Knowing 
from Words (Springer, 1994); and David Owens, Reason without Freedom (Routledge, 2000), Chapters 9-11.  I’ll 
engage Burge’s view directly in the final three sections below. 
3 “Telling as Inviting to Trust,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70:3 (2005); “Can 
Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?,” Abstracta, Special Issue VI (2012): A Symposium on Paul 
Faulkner’s Knowledge on Trust; “Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge,” Noûs 47:4 (2013); “Assurance and 
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and Testimony,” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by S. Goldberg (Oxford University Press, 2020). 
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pathology by appeal to the illocutionary norms governing the speech act of telling, with an 
emphasis on violations on the speaker’s side.  Pursuing the parallel, what norms govern the 
contribution of the earlier self in an intrapersonal memory relation?  There are two sides in the 
species of memory that we’re considering: the earlier self judges that p, then memory keeps the 
later self in epistemic touch with that judgment by ‘preserving’ its warrant.  Nothing like an 
illocutionary relation figures here.  (When you ‘tell yourself that p,’ you’re trying to ‘convince 
yourself’ that p and as such typically do not yet even judge that p.)  Despite the absence of a 
speech act, I’ll argue, the earlier self offers an assurance by extending an invitation to trust.  
There is an invitation to trust in your earlier self’s judgment that p precisely here: that judgment 
projects a future in which you will continue to trust yourself on the question whether p when you 
lose access to the evidence that informed the judgment.  That trust in yourself posits a worthiness 
of trust that ought to lead others to accept the invitation to trust informing your testimony that p. 
We grasp the normative complexity of this intrapersonal relation by seeing how 
pathology emerges when it breaks down – as it so vividly does in the victim’s plight in Gaslight.  
Kate Abramson has rightly emphasized how gaslighters aim to disable the victim’s judgment in 
order to avoid challenges to their dialogical authority.4  Our question is how gaslighting can do 
this.  As I’ll explain, gaslighting works by exploiting a vulnerability built into a key dimension of 
rational responsiveness: your responsiveness to evidence about your own status as relevantly 
trustworthy when you judge.  You need others, and a responsiveness to others, to serve as a 
corrective when your judgment is not relevantly trustworthy.  You are not the prisoner of your 
judgment – passively willing to go wherever it takes you.  You could not be fully rational if you 
 
4 Kate Abramson, “Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting,” Philosophical Perspectives 28 (2014). 
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were.  But your responsiveness to others’ resistance to your judgment does more than make you 
fully rational.  As we see depicted in the film, it also makes you vulnerable to manipulation. 
I’ll present the case from Gaslight in Section I.  In Sections II and III, I’ll develop a 
dialectic between two interpretations of it, an Evidential Interpretation that may seem plausible at 
first glance and an opposing Assurance Interpretation that I favor.  The point isn’t that the latter 
is the best interpretation of the film but that it is coherent and compelling, and that as such it 
helps clarify how an emphasis on assurance might vindicate a normative parallel between 
testimony and memory.  The Assurance Interpretation will lead to questions about the Socratic 
nature of interpersonal assurance (Section IV), how there could be such a thing as intrapersonal 
assurance (Section VI), and in what sense, if any, an assurance can count as (in Tyler Burge’s 
term of art) ‘preserving’ content or epistemic status across perspectives, whether interpersonal or 
intrapersonal (Section V).  I’ll conclude, in Section VII, by emphasizing the Socratic nature of 
intrapersonal assurance, which imposes, as I’ll argue, a normative constraint on judgment.  I’ll 
emphasize throughout a dimension of normativity that imposes not merely an epistemic 
constraint but a constraint on how judgment manifests a grasp of concepts. 
I. How might testimony cure a pathology of memory? The case of Paula Anton 
Let’s begin by seeing why we must understand the pathology of gaslighting in this deeper 
dimension, not merely as a pathology of judgment but as a pathology of the understanding – that 
is, as lying in one’s grasp of the concepts that one would apply in judgment.  How does the link 
between memory and testimony emerge in Gaslight?  Briefly put, Paula Anton lets herself be 
manipulated by her husband Gregory into the fear that she is going insane.  The denouement 
 5 
arrives as she escapes from that fear through conversation with a detective, Brian Cameron 
(Joseph Cotten).  The scene depicts vividly how her words not only mark that escape but enact it: 
Paula: I’m sorry, I haven’t talked to anyone for a long time.  I can’t talk to you 
either.  I’m afraid... I’m not... I’m afraid I... 
Brian: You’re afraid you’re going out of your mind?  Well, I’m here to prove to 
you that you’re not.  To help me do that, you’ve got to answer my 
questions. 
Paula proceeds to answer his questions.  And answering them cures her affliction, a cure 
expressed by the self-recognition: “At last I can tell this to someone.” 
How exactly does Paula’s regained capacity to engage in acts of testimony constitute her 
cure?  Best to flip that question around: how does her fear for her sanity lie in her feeling that she 
cannot talk to people?  As a first approximation, one might hypothesize that gaslighting works by 
exploiting a constitutive link between interpersonal reason-giving through testimony and 
intrapersonal rational self-governance through judgment.  On this view, the distinctive epistemic 
injustice that we call ‘gaslighting’ embodies a more complex form of the silencing than we find 
in illocutionary disablement.5  Unlike the illocutionarily disabled, the victim of gaslighting can 
perform the speech act in question, since she can get her illocutionary intention recognized by 
those whom her speech act addresses.  What she cannot do, on this view, is thereby regard 
herself as a source of epistemic reasons for those addressees.  In systematically failing to regard 
 
5 For this term, see Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 22:4 (1993), 315.  For development of the idea, see Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, “Free Speech and 
Illocution,” Legal Theory. 4:1 (1998). 
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herself as a source of reasons for addressed others, she gradually loses grip on how her judgment 
could provide rational guidance for herself.  And so the victim becomes more deeply silenced in 
a dimension of epistemic self-mistrust.  She can speak but won’t.  She can give reasons by 
speaking her mind – epistemic reasons to believe her testimony – but because she cannot herself 
feel the force of those reasons it seems to her as if she hasn’t got a mind to speak.  On this view, 
an understanding of these connections between reason-giving through testimony and rational 
guidance through judgment enables us see how it could cure her merely to find someone who, 
like Brian Cameron, will actually listen and take her at her word.  In giving what this interlocutor 
will accept as reasons grounded in ‘her word,’ Paula relearns how to treat her judgment as a 
rational guide – as a source of rational requirements for herself and of epistemic reasons or 
warrant for others.  (I’ll use ‘reasons’ as the summary term for all such forms of rational 
guidance.  Though this usage obviates a debate that I lack space to consider, nothing turns on it.6) 
It is, I believe, a good first pass on an account of how gaslighting works to say that it 
disables its victim’s judgment by thus trading on a normative parallel between memory and 
testimony.  But we now confront a legitimate worry that the account cannot do justice to two 
core elements in the explanandum presented by gaslighting.  To see the worry, we need to step 
back and ask what makes gaslighting a distinctively important concept in understanding our 
social world.  (I’ll take for granted that it is both important and distinctive.)  There are two core 
elements in gaslighting: the pathology that lies in the victim’s feeling that she is, as Brian 
Cameron puts it in the film, ‘going out of her mind ’ and the cure that lies (somehow; we’re 
 
6 In fuller treatments (“Rational Requirements and ‘Rational’ Akrasia,” Philosophical Studies 
166:3 (2013), and “On the Risks of Resting Assured: An Assurance Theory of Trust,” I clarify that – in light of John 
Broome’s work (e.g. “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?” in C. 
Morris and A. Ripstein (eds), Practical Rationality and Preference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
98-120) – these ‘reasons’ are better called ‘rational requirements’ or ‘dimensions of rational coherence.’ 
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trying to understand how it lies) in the restoration of her capacity to give testimony – as Paula 
puts it, to ‘tell this to someone.’  If we can understand how gaslighting includes both elements, 
we can explain the most fundamental datum that it is dialogical rather than monological.  Though 
Gregory Anton’s aim is ultimately monological – to have his wife institutionalized in order to 
gain access to jewels hidden in her attic – his gaslighting tactic specifically targets Paula’s ability 
to enter into dialogue with people.7  But how can we explain the two core elements?  How does 
Paula’s testimony to Brian provide a cure for her pathology of memory?  It is possible, of course, 
that Gaslight does not reveal any such deep connection between testimony and memory.  But my 
hypothesis is that we ought to try to vindicate the appearance that it does. 
The proposal that gaslighting is dialogical in  a way that reveals a connection between 
testimony and memory derives from an apt observation: both Gregory’s and Brian’s 
interventions target Paula’s capacity to give – and, more fundamentally, to view herself as 
capable of giving – reasons.  But if we treat this observation as the key to explaining the two core 
elements, we confront the worry that Paula’s response to Gregory’s intervention is not, from her 
own perspective, irrational – not anything that, as such, stands in need of a cure.  Consider what 
disables Paula’s judgment – that is, her self-assessed entitlement to a memory judgment – about 
the location of a painting or the contents of her purse.  One central cause of the disability is her 
appreciation of the evidence that Gregory has given her of her unreliability as a judge.  Both 
well-placed onlookers and we the audience can see that this evidence is manipulatively 
 
7 A word on my methodology using this film.  Since there are no actual gaslights in our world, the 
term ‘gaslighting,’ used in the way we’re investigating, obviously functions as a metaphor.  More fully, the usage 
comprises two figures of speech: it is a metaphor built on a metonymy.  Thinking about the 1944 Hollywood film 
(I’ll ignore the 1940 British film and the earlier play, since few have seen these), wherein there are actual gaslights, 
we metonymically treat that actual gaslighting as standing for the psychological dynamic to which it bears a key 
relation.  As I’ll emphasize, I present my interpretation of the film merely as a possible interpretation.  What’s 
important is merely that it be coherent and compelling as a possible case about which we can reflect philosophically. 
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misleading.  But part of what defines her predicament is that Paula cannot.  As far as she can tell, 
the evidence really does discredit the reliability of her judgment.  So she mistrusts her judgment 
– as it would have been reasonable for her to do had the evidence not been misleading. 
How, we might generally wonder, does Paula’s self-mistrust amount to a pathology?  She 
is in a nasty predicament – with the evidence available to her and with the interpersonal relation 
between her and her husband.  But there is no pathology, it seems, in her.  She is responding to 
her predicament as well as she can, and the self-mistrust that disables her judgment seems 
warranted by the evidence at hand.  The film’s melodrama requires that this plot contour be 
simplified to the point of caricature.  But she is not ‘going crazy’ in letting this evidence weigh 
with her, even if that evidential responsiveness leads to self-mistrust.  What we have, it seems, is 
a subject who comes to mistrust herself by responding to evidence of her unreliability and then 
regains self-trust by responding to new evidence that she is reliable in addressing testimony to 
Brian Cameron, since he treats her and her judgment as reliable.  Her testimony ‘cures’ her only 
insofar as it generates evidence that either outweighs or defeats the evidence that warrants her 
self-mistrust.  (The former defeats the latter evidence if she regards the former as evidence that 
the latter is misleading; otherwise it merely outweighs it.)  If our aim is to explain the pathology 
induced specifically in the victim by gaslighting, this approach appears to miss the mark. 
In the next two sections we’ll consider two very different ways of responding to this 
worry.  In Section II, we’ll consider what I’ll call the Evidential Interpretation of the proposal 
that we’ve considered in this section.  In Section III, we’ll consider an opposing Assurance 
Interpretation.  As we’ll see, the key issue between them lies in how they respond not to this 
worry about Paula’s affliction but to a different worry about how her testimony to Brian 
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Cameron could constitute a cure.  I’ll argue that the Assurance Interpretation offers a compelling 
explanation of this contribution. 
II. The Evidential Interpretation 
The Evidential Interpretation of our proposal emphasizes the evidence available to Paula about 
her condition: first the evidence that Gregory gives her that she is in a pathological condition, 
then the evidence that Brian gives her that she is not.  To see what’s distinctive of Paula’s 
perspective in the first stage, it helps to compare her predicament to the predicament of an 
elderly subject whose spouse confronts her with evidence of her failing memory.  Consider two 
scenarios with such a subject – two variants on what I’ll generically call the Dementia Case. 
Nice Donna does not realize that she suffers from short-term memory 
loss, but her ailment is obvious to her spouse, who, concerned for 
her welfare, does his best to alert her of her symptoms. 
Nasty Like Donna, Delilah does not realize that she suffers from short-
term memory loss, but her spouse sees an opportunity to 
manipulate her, for his own selfish reasons, by making her aware 
of her symptoms.  It is convenient for the spouse’s manipulative 
gambit that he can speak truthfully in testifying to her symptoms, 
but he would have offered the same testimony (with further 
manipulation of evidence, as needed) even if it had been false. 
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Donna’s predicament in Nice resembles Paula’s in Gaslight (with, say, a misplaced broach or a 
misremembered painting) but the evidence lovingly presented by her spouse counts as good 
evidence that Donna ought not to trust her memory, and generally her dispositions to judge on 
that basis, in the way that she used to do.  This subject is not at all ‘going crazy’ – though it may 
feel disorienting for Donna to mistrust her own memory and judgment in the way required by the 
evidence her spouse presents.  In Nice we’re imagining a healthy marriage, nothing like the 
pathological relation into which Paula has unknowingly entered with Gregory.  But in Nasty, by 
contrast, we imagine that our dementia patient, Delilah, confronts a second problem, over and 
above the dementia itself: her spouse aims to make her believe that she has dementia not in order 
to help her cope with the symptoms but in order to manipulate her into falling in line with some 
otherwise unrelated plan of his own.  Delilah’s predicament thus exactly resembles Paula’s – 
with the one exception that Delilah really has the ailment that Gregory aims to make Paula 
falsely believe that she has. 
How might we get a Brian Cameron figure into this story?  The figure needn’t, of course, 
be just one person, but whoever it is must – to follow this model – offer the possibility of 
testimonial relations that that would counter the manipulative testimony of Delilah’s spouse.  We 
might begin with this case: 
Noncon Exactly as in Nasty, except now Delilah is able to engage in 
testimonial relations with other interlocutors, and those relations 
reveal to her that these others regard her judgment and memory as 
reliable in a way that her spouse does not. 
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This new case sets up a conflict between the manipulative intervention of Delilah’s spouse and 
these non-manipulative testimonial interventions from others.  (Think of the ‘noncon’ as deriving 
from how these others aim to provide the antidote to the spouse’s ‘con.’) 
In Noncon, the new testimony makes evidence available to Delilah that her spouse may 
be manipulating her, in something like the way that Gregory manipulates Paula in the film.  And 
this new evidence counters the evidence that Delilah’s spouse gives her that she is suffering from 
dementia.  Which evidence is real, and which merely apparent (perhaps because intentionally 
misleading)?  We have stipulated both that Delilah really is suffering from dementia and that her 
spouse really is manipulating her, testifying to her dementia for reasons that have little to do with 
evidence that the testimony is true.  What if we lift both restrictions?  That leaves us with the 
next case, and a new protagonist. 
Nebulous As in Noncon, except that we lift the stipulation that the subject – 
now call her Deborah – suffers from dementia and that her spouse 
is manipulating her.  We now say that she may suffer from 
dementia, and that he may be manipulating her.  But it is possible 
that she does not and he is not – and that the other interlocutors are 
themselves manipulating her, or perhaps merely speaking in error.  
Everything, in other words, is up for grabs.  All we specify in this 
case is the testimony. 
Nebulous thus returns us to how things look from the perspective of someone in Paula’s 
predicament.  All Deborah and Paula have is this testimony – of their spouses, and of others who 
belatedly opposed that spousal testimony – to weigh against the felt authority of their own 
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memory judgments.  How should they weigh this testimony?  It has the virtue of simplicity to 
say that they should weigh it simply as evidence – alongside whatever other evidence they have 
– in their efforts to understand where things stand for them. 
How might this comparison help us make sense of the idea that Paula fears for her sanity?  
On first glance, this emphasis on evidence appears to make the problem sketched in the previous 
section even worse.  How you ought to respond to apparent evidence in a case with this structure 
can be complicated.  But in navigating the complexities, as we saw, you need not be ‘going out 
of your mind.’  You might, of course, navigate them badly.  But, as we noted in the previous 
section, Paula does not navigate her complicated predicament badly.  Though the film’s 
melodrama distracts us from a realistic understanding of her struggles, she appears to manage her 
predicament in a broadly reasonable manner.  That said, however, the parallel with the Dementia 
Case suggests a simple diagnosis of Paula’s fear that she is losing her sanity: she fears for her 
sanity because she does not believe that any plausible medical diagnosis could justify the charge 
that she is suffering from dementia.  The parallel with the Dementia Case accordingly suggests a 
general account of gaslighting: Gregory gaslights Paula insofar as he (i) aims to give her what 
she will receive as evidence that she is suffering a serious psychological impairment but (ii) does 
not believe that she actually suffers from that impairment.  Gaslighting would thus amount to a 
simple species of lying.  The gaslighter lies to – in general, willfully misleads – his victim about 
the state of the victim’s mental health, aiming to give her misleading evidence that her mental 
health is impaired.  If the victim has independent evidence to believe that her mental health may 
be compromised in the respect at issue, the manipulation gives her evidence that she may be able 
to cope with constructively.  But if there is no such independent evidence, and therefore no 
constructive story with which to frame the gaslighter’s intervention, then the victim cannot 
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respond constructively.  In that case, all she can do is lapse into despair about her condition, a 
despair that is likely to include despair about her ability to serve as a source of reasons, whether 
for testimonial addressees or for herself. 
Although I’m going reject this interpretation of our proposed account of gaslighting, I 
believe we can learn something important from seeing why it’s wrong.  The first step in that 
dialectic is to note that while this account appears to provide an effective explanation of one of 
the two core elements discussed in Section I, it does so at the cost of rendering inexplicable the 
other core element.  Perhaps we can now make sense of Paula’s feeling that she is losing her 
sanity, but how can we make sense of Brian Cameron’s success in helping her regain it?  As far 
as the Evidential Interpretation takes us, testimony cannot on its own constitute a cure, or even 
part of a cure, for the pathology of memory that we find in gaslighting.  The fact that Brian treats 
her judgment as reliable may give Paula evidence that it is reliable, but she could equally get 
evidence of its reliability by learning that a snooping Brian treats her diary as reliable or that a 
neuroscientific Brian treats her beliefs as reliable by reading them directly from activity in her 
brain – not to mention more direct evidence of reliability that does not emerge from others’ 
responses to it.  A response to Paula’s testimony can give her evidence of her reliability, but if 
that’s what she needs she would do better to keep written records of her verified judgments, and 
bear witness to the reliability herself.  How then might testimony on its own contribute to a cure 
for this pathology of memory? 
As I’ll now explain, the challenge lies in explaining how Paula could get the evidence 
that she seeks – evidence about her capacity, as testifier, to give an addressee reasons – 
specifically from her addressee’s receptivity to those reasons.  I’ll argue that the evidential model 
that we have developed in this section cannot explain this possibility but that an alternative 
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model can.  Toward that end, I’ll propose an alternative interpretation of Brian Cameron’s 
intervention in the concluding act of the film.  In this section, we interpreted Brian’s uptake as 
confirming for Paula the reliability of her memory judgments.  In the next section I’ll argue that 
we should interpret his uptake as also confirming for Paula the communicative efficacy of some 
important concepts that she fears she may not properly grasp.  This new interpretation does not 
conflict with the earlier but supplements and deepens it.  What’s crucial for our purposes is that it 
deepens our understanding in a way that highlights how Brian’s reception of her testimony helps 
her cure the pathology of memory induced by her husband’s gaslighting. 
III. Introducing the Assurance Interpretation 
There are two ways we might describe the conflicts in Noncon and Nebulous.  We might present 
the conflict as a question of whom to believe: one’s spouse or these other testifiers?  Or we might 
say that this broader interpersonal context gives our subject further evidence, evidence that may 
outweigh (or otherwise defeat) the evidence generated by her spouse’s interventions.  Focusing 
on the film, should we ask whom Paula ought to believe, Brian Cameron or Gregory?  Or should 
we ask instead about the evidence – whether the evidence made available through Brian 
Cameron’s testimony outweighs the evidence made available through Gregory’s?  The account 
presented in the previous section endorsed the second way of posing the question.  We’re now 
ready to consider how we might develop a principled alternative. 
To develop the alternative, it will help to step back and review how we’ve reached this 
point.  On the proposal we considered in Section I, the pathology at the core of gaslighting lies in 
how it disables the victim’s judgment specifically by undermining her conception of herself as a 
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source of reasons for potential interlocutors.  If it cannot serve as a source of reasons for 
recipients of her testimony, Paula fearfully reasons, then her judgment cannot serve as a source 
of reasons for herself.  When I say that she ‘fearfully reasons,’ I mean that this train of thought 
articulates her fears, not that it informs a judgment that would be disabled by a self-application 
of this reasoning.  Her predicament is shaped, all sides agree, by her fearful or anxious reluctance 
to judge and her consequent reliance on the influence of the gaslighter.  The question is how to 
explain that reluctance, and specifically what, if anything, the reluctance has to do with her 
capacity to give testimony. 
In Section II we developed the Evidential Interpretation, and that interpretation has led us 
to our present impasse.  On the Evidential Interpretation, Paula’s case motivates a positive 
account of gaslighting insofar as it parallels a version of the Dementia Case: the pathology at the 
core of gaslighting lies simply in the victim’s belief – or if ‘belief’ is too strong a term, in her 
active disposition to believe – that she is suffering from something very like dementia.  The 
interpretation begins from the observation that Gregory treats her in a way that approximates 
how one would naturally treat an elderly person who appeared to display the symptoms of 
dementia.  Looking at the treatment itself – that is, at what one says and at how one presents 
oneself as regarding the recipient – all sides agree that there need be no significant difference 
between gaslighting and the Dementia Case.  And, on the Evidential Interpretation, there need 
likewise be no significant difference from the perspective of the recipient of the treatment.  The 
only significant difference, for this interpretation, lies here: the victim of gaslighting is being 
intentionally manipulated into this predicament by the perpetrator, whereas someone who is 
merely treated as if she had dementia is not being thus manipulated.  Though Paula may be 
coping with the treatment as well as she can, the same may be true in a Dementia Case, and this 
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has nothing to do with the nature of the pathology in gaslighting.  Putting this upshot of the 
Evidential Interpretation bluntly, the pathology in gaslighting lies only in its status as 
manipulation, not in the predicament into which the victim is manipulated. 
The Evidential Interpretation draws a simple comparison between gaslighting and any 
version of the Dementia Cases described in Section II.  This comparison reveals how Paula 
might, despite responding reasonably, nonetheless feel that she is ‘losing her mind.’  If the 
dementia is real, its victim really is losing her mind, with evidence of that reality available to her 
in all sorts of ways.  But even if it is not, she is being treated as if she is losing her mind, and she 
thereby receives evidence that she is from this very treatment.  Either way, then, she might 
intelligibly come to feel that she is losing her mind, and we might regard the latter case – the 
second variant – as an all-too-common instance of the kind of manipulation that lies at the core 
of gaslighting.  Whether we call it ‘gaslighting’ may rest on our assessment of the manipulator’s 
motives.  Gregory aims at the manipulation directly – not for its own sake, but as a key 
instrument in his project of gaining access to Paula’s family’s jewels.  A manipulative dementia 
case may differ not only in degree of manipulation but also in kind: perhaps the manipulative 
spouse acts merely from anxiety over the future of their life together, earnestly misreading 
benign evidence as malignant.  On the Evidential Interpretation, these cases lie on a spectrum. 
The Evidential Interpretation regards the interlocution in all such cases as merely in the 
business of generating evidence, and this feature of the proposal generates two interesting 
implications.  One implication is that the distinctive element in the Evidential Interpretation 
appears to capture one side the dialectic between two opposing positions on the epistemology of 
testimony.  On what I’ll call an ‘assurance theory’ of testimony, the epistemic warrant generated 
by testimony derives in part from an aspect of the interpersonal relation between testifier and 
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addressee that cannot be understood simply in terms of evidence made available to the latter.  
The Evidential Interpretation stands opposed to that explanation, supporting instead what I’ll call 
an ‘evidential theory,’ on which testimonial warrant derives entirely from evidence that the 
testifier is speaking the truth.  In saying that the warrant ‘derives from’ this evidence I do not 
mean that the addressee gets the warrant only insofar as he weighs the evidence or otherwise 
engages in evidential reasoning.  On some ‘evidential theories’ (as I’ll use the term), the 
addressee can obtain the warrant without any evidential reasoning or even any pertinent 
evidential responsiveness – so long the evidence exists, typically in the form of the testifier’s 
truth-conducive reliability.  On an ‘assurance theory,’ by contrast, there is a crucial aspect of 
testimonial warrant that cannot be understood evidentially, even in this extended sense of 
averting to evidence from which the addressee cannot reason or to which he cannot respond.  
One upshot of this difference is that the proponent of an assurance theory holds that a testifier 
may make available to an addressee an epistemic warrant that she does not at the same time 
make available to overhearers, even when addressee and overhearers share all relevant evidence 
concerning the testifier’s truth-conducive reliability.  Proponents of evidential theories deny this: 
if the evidence is the same, they hold, the testifier must make the same warrant available to 
testifier and overhearer alike. 
We’ll now pursue a dialectic about the nature of gaslighting – and therefore, I’m 
assuming, about the relation between testimony and memory8 – that mirrors this debate insofar 
as the Evidential Interpretation replicates the evidential emphasis of the evidential theory of 
testimony.  Insofar as it replicates that emphasis, it places the proponent of an alternative 
 
8 Remember: both interpretations target our original proposal, that the pathology of gaslighting lies 
in how it disables the victim’s confidence in herself as a source of reasons both for others, through testimony, and 
for herself, in memory.  That proposal constitutes the core rationale for using gaslighting as a guide to understanding 
the relation between testimony and memory. 
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interpretation in the position of a proponent of an assurance theory in this one key respect: the 
proponent of the alternative interpretation will argue that we cannot explain the pathology of 
gaslighting as a purely evidential pathology. 
So how might an alternative emphasis on interpersonal relations challenge the Evidential 
Interpretation?  Our question, again, is how to interpret our original proposal, which targets the 
victim’s capacity to give reasons to an addressee.  The Evidential Interpretation emphasizes the 
evidential – that is, the truth-conducive – nature of those reasons, but note that the victim’s 
capacity to give reasons also operates in the interpersonal dimension of communicative 
engagement.  The Evidential Interpretation places all its emphasis on how a testifier’s truth-
conducive reliability generates evidence that the proposition asserted is true.  It places no 
particular emphasis on the meeting-of-minds that constitutes communication between testifier 
and addressee.  An alternative interpretation might therefore emphasize this communicative 
engagement.  But how could such communication engagement figure in gaslighting? 
On the Assurance Interpretation that I’ll develop, gaslighting marks the predicament not 
so much of Deborah in Nebulous but of the protagonist in this brief tale: 
Confusion Paula has come to worry that she misunderstands the consequences 
of marriage, and specifically how entering into a marital contract 
changes the distribution of authority between spouses.  Newly 
married to Gregory, Paula finds that Gregory is disposed to ‘speak 
for’ her memory – to claim authority over what she does and does 
not remember – in a way that confuses and troubles her.  Is this 
like how a husband might commit his wife to a social engagement, 
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claiming authority over her future?  With only unusual exceptions, 
Paula is willing to accept that the marital contract gives her 
husband the latter authority.  But does this authority to say what 
she will do extend to what feels to her like a very different 
authority to say what she has done – and to correct her memory 
judgments, if it comes to that?  Speaking to Brian Cameron, she 
finds it reassuring that he accepts her testimony with an attitude 
that confirms her assumption that it is no part of the marital 
contract that either party has authority over the other’s memory. 
I do not claim that the predicament of ‘Paula’ in this brief tale coincides perfectly with the 
predicament of Paula Anton in Gaslight.  While I regard this as a possible and indeed a 
compelling interpretation of the film, our task is not to make sense of this particular film but to 
see how an account of gaslighting can shed light on the link between testimony and memory.  As 
I’ll argue in the next section, Paula’s predicament in Confusion, unlike Deborah’s in Nebulous, 
fits quite well with an emphasis on the link between testimony and memory that we’ve been 
trying to develop since Section I.  Our understanding of that predicament can thereby serve as 
the basis of a theory of that link and – most importantly for our purposes – as the basis of an 
explanation of the role of assurance in the epistemology of memory. 
IV. Assurance as an occasion for Socratic reflection 
Our aim, again, is to understand Paula’s predicament in a way that takes at face value what I’m 
calling its two core elements: that her good-faith attempt to navigate it makes her feel like she’s 
 20 
‘going out of her mind’ and that it cures this pathology for Brian to receive her testimony about 
what has happened.  I’ll now argue that gaslighting works by inducing uncertainty at a deeper 
communicative level, not merely about one’s capacity to give reasons but about the stability of 
one’s conceptual commitments.  I’ll introduce that deeper level by mapping it onto the issue 
theorized over roughly the past thirty-five years as the normativity of meaning. 
In terms borrowed from Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein,9 gaslighting trades on how one 
might worry that there’s a ‘bend’ in the rule constituting the meaning of a term where one had 
not expected a bend.  Paula thus worries that getting married introduces a bend in the concept of 
one’s authority over one’s memory: before entering into the marital contract, one has full 
authority (at least, in normal cases) over the contents of one’s memory, but marriage gives to a 
husband new and possibly conflictual authority over his wife’s memory.  Kripke’s famously, and 
more fancifully, used as his example the bend in the concept that he invents for the term ‘quus’: 
the extension of ‘quus’ is identical to the extension of ‘plus’ for numbers below 57 (by 
hypothesis, you’ve never before added a number higher than 56) but the ‘bend’ appears when 
you add 57 and 68, yielding not the sum but the ‘quum’ of 5.  (Kripke defines quaddition as 
coextensive with addition for addends below 57 but as diverging thereafter: instead of the sum 
for any addend of 57 or higher, quaddition generates the quum of 5.)  The worry that one means 
quus rather than plus in one’s current application of ‘+’ (and therefore ought to answer ‘5’) could 
arise only in a philosophical thought experiment, but what I’m calling a ‘bend’ in one’s 
conceptual commitments isn’t anything esoteric.  A ‘bend’ arises whenever there is a shift in the 
application conditions of the concept tied to the introduction of a new background context. 
 
9 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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Many non-esoteric concepts admit the possibility of such a ‘bend.’  Normative concepts 
provide especially common examples.  Say you’re a man who regards all unattached women as 
‘dateable,’ till you receive a promotion and encounter an unattached woman whose status as your 
employee makes her surprisingly undateable – surprisingly only because you’re clueless about 
how this background power differential affects the application conditions of ‘dateable.’  An 
aesthetic example may, by contrast, mix normative with more purely perceptual elements.  Say 
you go well into adulthood without hearing atonal music, and you are surprised that a flat-ninth 
interval does not sound dissonant without a background tonal center: remove the tonality, and 
with it go both dissonance and consonance – a surprise to you.  You may likewise be surprised 
by how color concepts apply in a novel context of neon lighting – not a normative matter at all.  
In all three cases, you may feel confused about this ‘bend,’ and pursue Socratic reflection and 
debate with interlocutors as you articulate and adjudicate your confusions.  Or you may need no 
such adjudication as interlocution immediately reveals the dispositions informing your usage as 
out of step not merely with your fellows but with the normative contours of the concept. 
What’s disorienting about being gaslighted is that one becomes confused whether the 
new context should have this ‘bending’ effect and generally how to go forward in one’s 
applications of the concept on the hypothesis that it does.  Thus confused, one may benefit from 
a testimonial exchange that confirms how one’s conceptual commitments actually work.  Since 
gaslighting works by exploiting the confusion for nefarious ends, the gaslighter works to prevent 
such a testimonial exchange from occurring.  In the film, Gregory both induces the confusion 
and prevents Paula from seeking normal contexts of testimonial exchange.  When Paula does 
have a normal conversation about her predicament with Brian Cameron, his receptiveness to her 
testimony reassures her that the rule is not bent and that she therefore does not misunderstand 
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what it is to have entered into the relation that she now bears to Gregory.  With her conceptual 
commitments thus clarified, she can address her predicament constructively, by confronting 
Gregory with the contents of her memory in full confidence of her authority over them. 
What Paula gets from Brian is a reassurance that derives from his responsiveness to the 
assurance that informs her testimony.  I am happy to say that she gets reassuring evidence from 
his responsiveness; what distinguishes the Assurance Interpretation from the Evidential 
Interpretation, is how the former characterizes what he gets from her testimony.  To mark this 
distinction between what Brian gets and what Paula gets, I’ll say that Brian gets an ‘assurance’ 
from Paula, whereas Paula gets a ‘reassurance’ from Brian.  But again, I claim only that the 
assurance given by Paula cannot be understood in terms of evidence, not that the reassurance 
given by Brian cannot be.  To defend the Assurance Interpretation, we need to show that the 
Evidential Interpretation cannot make good sense of the narrative in Confusion.  The Evidential 
Interpretation cannot explain how Paula could get this reassurance, I’ll argue, because she could 
not get it from Brian’s response if the only thing her testimony gave him were evidence. 
It will help if we frame the issue in terms that parallel Kripke’s treatment of the bent 
concept quus.  Here, again, is Kripke’s definition of ‘quus’: 
Quus x quus y = (a) if x and y are both less than 57, then x plus y; (b) if 
at least one of x and y  57, then 5. 
Now consider this definition of what I’ll call ‘quauthority’:  
Quauthority X has quauthority over Y = (a) if X and Y are not married, then X 
has relational authority over Y; (b) if X and Y are married, then X 
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has relational authority over Y plus authority over Y’s memory 
judgments. 
By ‘relational authority’ I mean the normal sort of authority that people have over each other’s 
actions and commitments when they are in an established relationship and are, as we say, sharing 
their lives.  Nothing turns on how we define this, except that we can see that no one would think 
that people who are sharing their lives in this ordinary sense, even as a married couple, have 
authority over their memory judgments.  We can see this, but Paula fears that it may well be true 
– and, even more alarmingly, that she herself has all along been exercising a concept of marital 
authority with this implication.  This fear creates the need for reassurance from an interlocutor 
like Brian.  Will he treat her as exercising the concept of authority or the concept of quauthority?  
If the conceptual commitments that inform her testimony align her with the former, then 
Gregory’s efforts to ‘speak for’ her memory judgments can be justly criticized as an illicit claim 
of authority.  But if those commitments align her with the concept of quauthority, then those 
efforts are licit on their own terms and can be justly criticized only on broader grounds – for 
example, on the grounds that the whole concept of quauthority is unjust.  She looks to Brian for 
help in settling this question about her conceptual commitments, and she is interested specifically 
in how he responds to her testimony as she narrates her struggles with Gregory’s claim of 
authority.  In a different setting, she could ask him directly how to define the concept that they 
share, but such an explicit Socratic exchange is, in her present circumstances, practically 
impossible.  Like most of us most of the time, she pursues such Socratic reflection implicitly, by 
seeking a reflected image of her commitments in the response of an addressee to her speech acts. 
Consider how the exchange would have to work on the evidential model: Paula’s 
testimony would give Brian evidence that p, and his responsiveness to this evidence for p would 
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have to give her evidence in turn that she is exercising the concepts that figure in p, including 
specifically the straight version of the concept at issue, rather than the bent version.  The problem 
is that the latter evidence – the evidence deriving from Brian’s response – is sensitive to the 
specific difference between the bent concept and the straight concept only insofar as it is 
supplemented by evidence that he affirms or disaffirms p – that is, by evidence that he agrees 
with her or evidence that he does not agree with her on the question whether p.  If she has 
evidence that he agrees with her that p – that is, that he affirms both that p and that, in so 
affirming, he agrees with her testimony – then Paula gets evidence that she is exercising the 
concepts that figure in p, including (for example) the straight concept authority rather than the 
bent concept quauthority.  She would get the latter evidence for the twofold reasons that (i) 
Brian’s affirmation that p would generate evidence about the truth conditions of p and thus of the 
application conditions of the concepts that figure in p and (ii) his agreement with her assertion 
would generate evidence that she is asserting that p.  For Paula to get the evidence she seeks, on 
the Evidential Interpretation, that evidence would have to lie in what would amount to a 
discussion between them, with a burden on her to understand whether Brian agrees or disagrees 
with her assertion.  But that is not where she is seeking the reassurance she seeks. 
Paula is not looking merely for evidence that she means the straight concept.  Such 
evidence could take many forms, but in every such form but one, interpreting the evidence will 
require substantial background assumptions – assumptions that, like the assumption that Brian 
agrees with her, Paula will need additional evidence to vindicate.  The one form of reassuring 
evidence that does not require substantial background assumptions lies in the uptake that Brian 
provides when he merely consummates her illocutionary act (in Austin’s metaphor).  To say that 
this evidence does not require substantial background assumptions is not to say that she needs no 
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evidence that Brian is in the room, that he hears her, and so on for everything that makes Brian’s 
uptake an empirical reality.  What’s crucial is that the reassuring evidence be evidence simply 
that the empirical reality of his uptake has occurred.  How could it give her the reassurance she 
seeks simply to appreciate evidence that her illocutionary act has been consummated?  It would 
give her the reassurance if the consummation consisted in his taking her word for it that p by 
trusting her.  By ‘taking her word’ I don’t mean believing her.  Believing her – that is, being 
convinced by her testimony – is a perlocutionary, not the illocutionary, aim of her speech act: it 
is not what she presents herself as aiming to do in telling him that p.  What she presents herself 
as aiming to bring about in telling Brian that p is that he treat her testimony that p as giving him 
a reason to believe that p.  I argue elsewhere that she aims to give him a reason that would count 
as sufficient or conclusive in his context, but that further claim is not crucial to my present 
point.10  What’s crucial is that, even if she aims to give him a conclusive reason, she need not 
also aim that he acknowledge that reason as conclusive and thereby form the belief.  Again, the 
former aim is her illocutionary aim, the latter her perlocutionary aim.  He satisfies her 
illocutionary aim by acknowledging the reason – that is, by trusting her to the extent that he 
treats her as giving him the reason – even if he does not also acknowledge the reason as 
conclusive for him.  But in getting evidence that he trusts her for this reason, she gets evidence 
that he understands the content of her testimony as she understands it – that is, as containing the 
straight rather than the bent concept of authority at issue – as containing authority rather than 
quauthority.  She gets this evidence not from background assumptions and evidence that 
supplement the uptake through which he consummates her illocution but from that uptake itself. 
 
10 My account in “Assurance and Warrant” builds on my account in “Telling as Inviting to Trust” 
by emphasizing that the speaker aims to give her addressee a reason that would count as conclusive in his context. 
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I’m building here on the assurance theory of testimony that I have defended at length 
elsewhere.11  My strategy is to apply that theory in developing an epistemology of memory that 
emphasizes a parallel between memory and testimony.  The parallel that I propose rests on the 
Assurance Interpretation of gaslighting, and the core of that defense lies here: Paula seeks 
reassuring evidence that derives from Brian’s mere consummation of her speech act.  There is no 
room, on the Evidential Interpretation, for the idea she gets such reassuring evidence from his 
mere consummation of her speech act, because there is no room there for the idea that he accepts 
her testimony as giving him a reason to believe that p grounded in part in her assurance – except, 
of course, insofar as that assurance gives him pertinent evidence.  Again, I’m happy to say that 
Brian’s responsiveness gives Paula reassurance by giving her evidence about her conceptual 
commitments.  The problem with appealing to evidence does not lie there but in the claim that 
she gives him nothing but evidence for p.  If she gives him nothing but evidence for p, then she 
does not give him the assurance that could, as we’re understanding it, be reflected in his 
consummating response to it, in turn giving her the evidence that she seeks about her conceptual 
commitments.  In seeking to understand her conceptual commitments as reflected in an 
addressee’s receptivity to her ‘her word’ – in her addressee’s willingness to ‘take’ her word – 
Paula implicitly pursues what I would theorize as a Socratic dimension of concept possession.  It 
forms part of the Socratic dimension of concept possession that you monitor your usage through 
responsiveness to how others are receptive to your concept-expressive acts.  Do they treat you as 
giving them a reason grounded partly in your assurance?  If not, how might this failure of 
illocutionary consummation lie in a specific failure to communicate by sharing a repertoire of 
concepts?  As we’ll see in the next three sections, we cannot understand this ‘meeting of minds’ 
 
11 See the papers cited in note 2. 
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simply as the ‘preservation’ of content across perspectives, as if all one had to do to consummate 
a speech act is to grasp a shared content.  In both the interpersonal case and the intrapersonal 
case that we’ll now discuss, it is a normative accomplishment to share a content in this way. 
V. Content preservation and the dynamic stability of belief 
The Assurance Interpretation thus explains the interpersonal dynamic through which Paula’s 
sensitivity to how her testimony is received can help cure her conceptual confusion.  But what of 
the intrapersonal dynamic informing her memory judgments?  Our shift to this conceptual 
dimension, with its emphasis not primarily on the act of judgment but on grasp of the conceptual 
rule that informs judgment, may appear to have left behind Paula’s concern with the reliability of 
her memory as she confronts the questions whether and how to judge and therefore what, if the 
question arises, to tell others about what she remembers.  Have we thereby changed the subject 
away from the primary link between memory and testimony?  We have not, for the simple reason 
that talk of rule-following is always implicitly talk of memory. 
The film may obscure this connection by its focus on Paula’s experiential memories.  
Gaslighting as a real-world interaction need not target the victim’s experiential memories, as the 
interaction between Gregory and Paula does in Gaslight the film.  But it does always target the 
victim’s propositional memories.  In Gaslight, it targets Paula’s beliefs about what being in love 
and being married will be like in many respects, beliefs formed earlier in her life that she has no 
reason to question till Gregory’s manipulation begins to falsify them.  But she wonders: Is he 
falsifying them? Or is he instead revealing that her concepts do not apply in the way she thought 
they did?  There is no dramatically effective way to depict this contrast in a film, so the film 
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targets not Paula’s grasp on a remembered concept but her experiential memories themselves.  
Instead of ‘I formed a belief that a is F, but F-ness doesn’t appear to be what I thought it was’ we 
get ‘I vividly remember that I did such-and-such, but it appears that I didn’t do such-and-such.’  
On the Assurance Interpretation, these experiential memories trouble Paula not only because 
they implicate her in a mistake about her experiences by also because they appear to show that 
she does not understand how her own concepts describe them. 
When you apply a concept by forming a belief or making an assertion, you thereby 
undertake or present yourself as undertaking inferential commitments whose content depends on 
how that concept relates to concepts that you have previously applied and can remember having 
applied in beliefs that you retain from those prior applications.  Let me elaborate one of the 
examples mentioned in Section IV.  As a jazz musician, you know how to improvise over a flat-
ninth interval when it adds dissonance to a dominant seventh chord – know-how informed by 
beliefs that you have retained from college classes in music theory – but now that the harmonic 
context is completely atonal, how do those memory beliefs apply?  We needn’t picture you 
responding in performance but reflecting on your improvisatory strategy in rehearsal.  If this 
marks a mere ‘bend’ in the application-conditions of the concept of dissonance, then you’ll have 
to figure out the right inferential relations between those memories and your present context of 
application.  If, on the other hand, this new context does not mark such a bend, then your 
dispositions to call it ‘dissonant’ will bear a different sort of relation to those memory beliefs.  
Perhaps the term would now express an entirely different concept, or perhaps its present use 
would count as a metaphorical application, with correspondingly looser inferential relations 
between the memory beliefs.  We can imagine similar circumstances for the other bent concepts 
that we considered.  In each case, the question directly if implicitly targets your memory: how 
 29 
would a present application bear on the inferential content of past applications, as retained 
through your memory in the form of stable beliefs? 
Applied intrapersonally to the stability of belief, the assurance model generates a new 
way to think about cases that Tyler Burge theorizes in terms of ‘content preservation.’12  These 
are cases coined as counterexamples to semantic-externalist or anti-individualist theories of 
meaning as ‘slow switch’ cases, though I’m going to call them ‘shift’ cases, since they address 
how meaning responds to a shift in broader context.  In a standard example, your context at an 
earlier time determines that you refer to H2O by ‘water’, but a shift in your environmental 
context ensures that you later refer to a different chemical XYZ by ‘water’.  When you make a 
judgment that you would express by saying ‘There was some water,’ aiming to ground that 
judgment in a remembered earlier judgment that you would then have expressed by saying 
‘There is some water,’ you’ve gone astray: you aim to ground a judgment about XYZ in a 
remembered judgment about H2O.13  This appears to undermine the assumption that your 
‘water’-beliefs are stable across such a shift, and if they are not thus stable you appear to lose 
your entitlement to reason from them.  Burge aims to vindicate the stability of belief by 
conceding that if you are not reasoning from a belief across a shift but instead merely attempting 
to re-report it, then you may go astray in this way.  But if you are reasoning from your earlier 
belief, he argues, then you are entitled to the presumption that it has remained stable.  Burge 
argues that in such a case we aren’t usually describing or reporting or commenting on what we 
thought – at least, not most fundamentally.  What are we doing then?  Burge argues that at the 
later time we are typically enacting or following through on what we thought at the earlier time.  
 
12 See the papers cited in notes 13 and 14 below. 
13 To save space, I’ll work from this rough formulation of the problem.  For a more refined 
formulation, see Paul Boghossian, “Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26 (1989). 
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When we think, Burge argues, our perspective is typically the perspective of critical reasoning.  
You cannot reason unless you undertake specific conceptual commitments – commitments that 
essentially have implications for future and past times.  To think about your thoughts is to think 
about these commitments as such – that is, to commit or uncommit yourself to them.  Sure, you 
can step back and merely report them.  If that’s all you’re doing, then there is room for a 
skeptical worry.  But typically that won’t be all you’re doing.  Disengaged self-commentary is 
not what we’re typically up to when we report our thoughts.  We’re engaged in thinking.  We 
aren’t merely reporting on our thinking in the way that we might report on someone else’s 
thinking.  Burge’s larger argument is that preservative memory is a necessary condition for our 
being able to be engaged self-critical thinkers. 
This species of intrapersonal criticism parallels a critical stance that you adopt when you 
reason with others.  I agree with Burge on the general parallel, though I gloss it with the 
assurance model’s distinctive emphasis on the Socratic dimension of concept possession.  
Though there may be no actual criticism in play, I agree with Burge that when you reason from 
an earlier belief you commit yourself to the possibility of an intrapersonal species of criticism 
that parallels, in some key respects, the potentially critical perspective on another that shapes 
how you can accept their testimony as giving you a reason irreducible to evidence of its truth.  (I 
lack space to discuss Burge’s complex argument for content preservation in testimony.14)  
Though my emphasis on assurance is crucially different from Burge’s emphases (as we’ll see 
presently), the possibility of criticism in each case presupposes that the concept with its 
conceptual commitments is stable across these intrapersonal or interpersonal perspectives. 
 
14 See “Content Preservation” (1993), “Interlocution, Perception, and Memory” (1997), 
“Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge and Other Minds” (1998), all reprinted in Tyler Burge, Cognition through 
Understanding: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3 (Oxford University Press, 2013).  I do discuss Burge’s view of 
testimony in “Telling as Inviting to Trust.” 
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The parallel is implicit in a shift case, but it become especially salient in the sort of case 
that Paula fears she’s in, which we’re calling a ‘bend case.’  A bend case more directly addresses 
how meaning is determined by one’s context of ongoing use.  In Kripke’s cartoonish version, 
you’ve spent your life using ‘+’ to mean a function coextensive with addition for numbers 
smaller than 57, never having added a number that large, and you now you conclude your 
arithmetical deliberation ‘58 + 67 = what?’ by answering ‘125.’  Is your answer correct?  It is 
correct if you mean plus by ‘+’.  But it is not correct if you have all along meant by ‘+’ not plus 
but quus, in which case you should have answered ‘5.’  In Paula’s much less cartoonish version 
(apart from the silly ‘q’-term we’ve coined), she judges that Gregory lacks ‘authority’ to 
question her memory but fears that by ‘authority’ she means not authority but quauthority, which 
Gregory does not lack because she is now his wife.  She does not worry that her meaning has 
shifted from what she used to mean by ‘authority’ but that she has all along meant quauthority – 
that is, used a concept with those conceptual commitments, commitments which make this key 
difference to how she conceptualizes her own ‘authority’ relations only now that she and 
Gregory have wed.  Though there is no shift, fear of a bend in conceptual commitment functions 
as if she feared a shift.  In each case – whether bend of shift – the challenge lies in knowing 
where you stand vis-a-vis your own past conceptual usage.  Are you entitled to presume that you 
understand how the grasped conceptual content of your past usage continues to commit you in 
present usage?  For our purposes, the key difference between a shift case and a bend case does 
not much matter.  If your presumption is false in a shift case, the falsity lies in how your present 
commitment differs from your past commitment.  But if your presumption is false in a bend case, 
you were all along committed in this way that falsifies your presumption.  What matters for our 
purposes is the possibility that your presumption is false – whatever else that entails. 
 32 
How do you maintain the stability of a belief that vindicates your presumption to 
understand how your present conceptual commitments are grounded in your past conceptual 
commitments?  I answer this question in the next two sections, where I also confront the 
inevitable question: how could an assurance function intrapersonally?  Let me first emphasize 
that the assurance model’s answers will appeal to a complex and dynamic intrapersonal relation.  
Even though it’s just you there and no speech act is in play – which points to a key disanalogy 
that we’ll explore in Section VI – this intrapersonal relation partakes of a complexity that 
parallels the complexity that we explored in the interpersonal case.  On the broad approach that I 
share with Burge, we explain the stability of belief by explaining how a belief can remain stable 
across a change in context that might have made it go unstable through a shift or a bend.  For 
Burge, our entitlement to reason in a way that presumes stability derives from very general 
considerations about how the self-critical stance that informs a capacity to reason rests on 
assumptions about the nature of selfhood and the capacity for first-personal reference.  (As with 
Burge’s treatment of testimony, I lack space even to do begin to discuss this view here.15)  My 
very different assurance model uses the parallel between memory and testimony to develop a 
model of the stability of belief that grounds this stability in a normative stance that functions as 
an intrapersonal assurance.  It follows that a proponent of the assurance model cannot rest with 
the observation that conceptual content is simply ‘preserved’ through memory.  Conceptual 
content is no more simply ‘preserved’ through memory, on the assurance model, that it is 
through a testimonial relation.  In each case, a Socratic dimension of the exchange makes the 
stability of belief more dynamic than that.  I agree with Burge that the epistemic and conceptual 
 
15 See “Content Preservation” (1993), “Memory and Self-Knowledge” (1996), “Our Entitlement to 
Self-Knowledge” (1996), and “Reason and the First-Person” (1998), in Burge’s Cognition through Understanding. 
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dimensions of ‘content preservation’ – that is, of doxastic stability – go hand in hand.  But I 
disagree in holding that doxastic stability is a normative accomplishment in both dimensions. 
VI. What is intrapersonal assurance? 
How could there be a purely intrapersonal assurance – an assurance without speech or any other 
public act?  To see how memory rests on an intrapersonal assurance, we must invert the 
temporality of memory, switching our perspective from that of the later remembering self 
looking back to that of the earlier judging self looking forward.  The key to understanding 
intrapersonal assurance lies in understanding the intrapersonal normativity of judgment.  I’ll now 
argue that the intrapersonal normativity of judgment rests crucially on the Socratic element that 
we isolated in our treatment of the interpersonal normativity of testimony.  The key to 
understanding how judgment functions as an assurance is to see who it is that’s being assured. 
Once again, it helps to consider the phenomenon of gaslighting – now from the 
perspective of the victim’s capacity for judgment.  How does a victim of gaslighting lose 
confidence in her judgment?  As we’ve seen, gaslighting exploits the vulnerability built into a 
key dimension of rational responsiveness: your responsiveness to your own status as trustworthy 
when you judge.  Since there are not literally two people in this relation – trusted judger and 
trusting recipient of the judgment – we need to exercise caution in how we frame it.  Moreover, 
any proposed parallel between judgment and testimony encounters a more immediate problem: 
as we use the expression, ‘telling yourself that p’ does not entail judging that p.  If you’re 
acrophobic, and you’ve unfortunately walked out on the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon, you 
might ‘tell yourself’ that the structure is safe – whispering to yourself “It’s safe, it’s safe” – 
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precisely because your acrophobia prevents you from straightforwardly or simply judging that it 
is safe.16  Whatever intrapersonal assurance amounts to, it therefore cannot be simply the 
internalization of a speech act.  What else then might it be?  As we’ll now see, the key to 
understanding the normative stance of judging that p lies in how it projects an audience whom 
you could sincerely tell that p.  The parallel lies not with any speech act of ‘telling’ or assuring 
yourself but with the speech act of telling and thereby assuring possible others. 
We can use the locution ‘telling myself that p’ to develop a case in which, unlike Paula’s, 
a disrupted judgment does not indicate pathology.  A Google search for the locution yields this 
newspaper report on a teenager whose breast cancer was diagnosed as benign, leading her to 
judge it benign – until a ‘feeling of unease’ began to wear away at that judgment. 
Elisa’s Cancer.  Over the next few months, Elisa's life went on as normal.  She 
carried on at uni, spending long afternoons rummaging through shops, building up 
her record collection.  But all the while, there was a feeling of unease that she 
couldn't shift.  ‘Every day, I kept telling myself it was nothing,’ she says.  ‘But 
every day as I dressed I'd feel the lump there.  I had to keep reminding myself that 
the doctors had done tests and they'd said it was fine – so how could it not be?’17 
Does Elisa judge that the lump in her breast is nothing – that is, not cancerous – when she “tells 
herself” that it is nothing?  (As the report makes clear, her unease is correct, as it turns out: the 
 
16 Tamar Gendler uses a case with roughly this content to motivate a different but related idea: that 
your acrophobic stance manifests a sub-doxastic state that she calls an ‘alief.’  (See her “Alief and Belief,” Journal 
of Philosophy 105:10 (2008), 634-663; and “Alief in Action (and Reaction), Mind and Language 23:5 (2008), 552-
585.)  My idea targets instead your anti-acrophobic state, which no longer functions as guiding you in the way that 
we mark with the word ‘judgment.’  (Readers who have the intuition about Gendler’s case that your acrophobic state 
runs contrary to your judgment – that is, to a judgment that you’ve made and retain – should think of this as a 
different case from Gendler’s.  Here your acrophobic really does prevent you from judging that the Skywalk is safe.) 
17 The Independent, 27 April 2010; italics added.   
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diagnosis turns out to be mistaken.)  The locution suggests that while she somehow thinks that 
she ‘should’ judge that the lump is nothing, that judgment is not one that she actually makes.  It 
suggests that she is trying to ‘talk herself into’ believing that the lump is nothing – but 
unsuccessfully, given the doxastic dispositions informed by her “feeling of unease.” 
How has Elisa wound up in this state?  The newspaper reports that, relieved by testimony 
from medical authorities, she begins by confidently judging that the lump is nothing, only to see 
her daily encounters with what turns out to be the lump erode that confidence.  As her confidence 
diminishes, she passes through a state in which she continues to judge that the lump is nothing 
but acts in some ways that seem to indicate that she does not believe that the lump is nothing.  
Finally, she winds up merely ‘telling herself’ that the lump is nothing, which figures as a halfway 
house en route to abandoning this judgment.  The transition thus takes this form: her final state of 
ambivalence resolves the akratic irrationality that marks the middle stage in which she loses 
confidence in this judgment that she has not yet abandoned.  Schematically put, Elisa shifts 
between two poles.  Earlier she counts as irrational insofar as she judges that p but is not 
doxastically disposed to act as if p.18  (She is, of course, disposed to act as if p in some respects.  
The problem is that she is not so disposed in other crucial respects – despite judging that p.)  
Then later Elisa ceases to be irrational because she no longer judges that p but merely ‘tells 
herself’ that p from a stance of non-committal ambivalence on the question whether p.19 
 
18 By a doxastic disposition, I mean a disposition that serves to structure and guide practical and 
theoretical reasoning in the way that a belief does, but without necessarily manifesting the subject’s judgment. 
19 Is this ‘upstream’ reasoning in the sense discussed by Niko Kolodny in “Why Be Rational?” 
(Mind 114 (2005), 509-563)?  Kolodny argues that ‘upstream’ reasoning is impossible, and I have attempted to 
counter this argument in “Rational Requirements and ‘Rational’ Akrasia, and “On the Risks of Resting Assured.”  
But I need not claim that abandoning your judgment in the spirit of self-mistrust amounts to ‘upstream’ reasoning 
for any purpose served in the present paper.  For present purposes I take no stand on whether the rational 
requirement linking judging that p with believing that p has narrow scope or wide, or on whether it is a state 
requirement or a process requirement, in the senses discussed by Kolodny. 
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How does Elisa’s predicament compare with your predicament as an acrophobe on the 
Grand Canyon Skywalk?  Since your contrary doxastic dispositions brought you to a state in 
which it is more accurate to say that you were merely ‘telling yourself’ that the Skywalk is safe, 
the Skywalk case is precisely similar to Elisa’s Cancer in this respect: you are now ambivalently 
undecided on the question, since you no longer count as judging that the Skywalk is safe.  What 
explains the dynamic?  Simply this: you thereby cease to persist in the irrational state of doxastic 
akrasia wherein you judge that p without being doxastically disposed to act as if p.20  Despite this 
parallel between Elisa’s Cancer and the Skywalk case, there is one very important difference 
between them: Elisa is not irrational to resist the force of her own judgment, and arguably would 
not have been irrational to resist it even if she had in the end been proven wrong, whereas you on 
the Skywalk clearly are irrational.  How should we explain this difference between the cases?  I 
think the difference lies here: Elisa abandons her judgment that the lump is benign when she can 
no longer imagine herself confidently and sincerely telling others that it is benign, whereas you 
abandon your judgment that the Skywalk is safe without any such projection into a context of 
possible testimony.  It is to Elisa’s credit that her inability to feel entitled to tell others – marked 
by her stuttering failure to assure herself (“I kept telling myself”) – leads her to abandon her 
judgment that the lump is benign.  But it is not to your credit that you cannot succeed in assuring 
yourself (“It’s safe, it’s safe,” you mutter to yourself) despite feeling perfectly entitled to give 
this assurance to others. 
How do both these cases compare to Paula’s predicament in Gaslight?  Note first a 
parallel in how manipulation of the normative structure might generate pathology.  Where a 
 
20 Like Elisa, you are doxastically disposed to act as if p in some respects.  The problem is merely 
that you are not so disposed in other respects – despite judging that p. 
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relation to an interlocutor, real or imagined, can serve as a proxy for your intrapersonal relations, 
your relation to that interlocutor, again real or imagined, makes you vulnerable to exploitation.  
Imagine that Elisa practices a religion that preaches mistrust of medical authorities.  On that 
basis alone, Elisa might find herself unable to imagine interlocutors whose trust she could 
sincerely and reasonably invite in testifying that the lump is benign.  It would make her 
predicament worse if she were married to such a coreligionist.  This case could share the 
normative structure of Elisa’s Cancer but with the normative valence of the Skywalk case: an 
irrational mistrust in her own judgment now mediated by interlocution rather than acrophobia.  
That is the combination of structure and valence that defines Paula’s predicament.  Paula is not 
the prisoner of her memory judgments.  Under the different circumstances that we imagined in 
Section II, she might come to doubt her memory in a way that, like Elisa’s actual case, confirms 
her status as fully rational.  But that would presuppose a capacity to imagine non-exploitative 
interlocutors.  In the film she does not gain access to a non-exploitative interlocutor until Brian 
Cameron elbows his way through Gregory’s defenses.  Brian’s appearance revives Paula’s 
imagination in a way that resuscitates her judgment precisely where Gregory’s stranglehold had 
led it to fail.  She can now imagine telling interlocutors what she would like to tell them – about 
the broach, about noises in the attic, about the gaslights – but had lost a feel for her capacity to 
tell them through Gregory’s manipulative insistence that she tell all such things only to him. 
The parallel rests on a common element in all three cases: each illustrates how a capacity 
to imagine oneself testifying constrains the rational normativity of judgment.  I elsewhere argue 
for this broad idea from several disparate angles.21  Here I’m arguing from the role of projected 
 
21 For distinct arguments for this thesis, see my “Receptivity and the Will,” Noûs 43:3 (2009); 
“Reflection, Disagreement, and Context,” American Philosophical Quarterly 49:2 (2012); and (most fully) 
“Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge,” Noûs 47:4 (2013). 
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stability in epistemic agency.  What cases like these reveal, I believe, are the real-world stakes of 
the doxastic stability projected by judgment, and how those stakes place a burden on the one who 
judges.  When Elisa merely ‘tells herself’ that the lump is benign, she has reached an impasse in 
exercising her capacity to project a stable future for the belief that it is benign, and the impasse 
involves the projection of an interpersonal relation because the parallel intrapersonal relation 
stretches into a future that has not yet come to pass.  Doxastic stability requires of her that the 
invitation to trust at the core of her judgment project stably into the contexts both of future selves 
who will accept the invitation by reasoning from or acting on the judgment and of present 
interlocutors who will accept by believing her testimony.  The dual-sided nature of doxastic 
stability permits her to use the synchronic testimonial case as a substitute for the diachronic case 
in which she judges only for herself.  It not only permits that substitution but requires it, since the 
two sides stand in what we might regard as a relation of normative equivalence.  One way to 
grasp the equivalence is to observe that if you invite another to believe on the basis of your 
testimony, you thereby also invite that other to project a future in which that belief will prove 
doxastically stable.  If you cannot sincerely and coherently do the latter then you cannot 
sincerely and coherently do the former.  (You could, of course, testify insincerely.)  An 
interlocutor can thus serve as a proxy for your own future self in purely intrapersonal projection. 
The basis of the parallel between these two projections – into the contexts of imagined 
interlocutors and into the contexts of your own future selves – lies in how both projects invite 
trust.  As we’re imagining the cases, the subject is not trying to imagine that these interlocutors 
will treat her testimony merely as a source of evidence, believing what that evidence dictates, but 
that they will trust her – that, even if she also gives them good evidence, they will more 
fundamentally believe her, by taking her word.  Therein, I’m claiming, lies its point: to imagine 
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how these interlocutors would react to her testimonial assurance.  Strictly speaking, as I 
emphasized in Section IV, she is trying to imagine that she has satisfied her illocutionary aim in 
testifying, giving them good reason to believe what she tells them, not that she has succeeded in 
realizing the perlocutionary aim of convincing them.  The point of this imaginative exercise 
derives from how these reactions would parallel – and could therefore substitute for – a reaction 
from her own future self: both projections amount to invitations to trust.  It is here that we see the 
most fundamental parallel between testimony and memory: the remembering self exercises a 
capacity for reasonable trust, in response to the invitation to trust that informs judgment, just as 
an addressee who believes a speaker exercises a capacity for reasonable trust by accepting the 
invitation to trust that informs the speaker’s testimony.  Let me again emphasize both that 
judgment is not a speech act and that trusting your judgment is not the same as trusting a 
speaker’s testimony.  As we’ve seen, you can be stuck ‘telling yourself’ that p in part because 
you don’t simply trust your judgment that p.  All I’m saying is that an invitation to trust lies at 
the core of both acts – at the core of both judgment and testimony. 
VII. Assurance as monitoring a normative constraint on judgment 
Having thus explained the possibility of intrapersonal assurance, my argument confronts a new 
objection.  Someone might accept both my view of testimony and my claim that imagined 
testimony plays the above-described role in constraining judgment and yet resist the idea that 
judgment invites trust, thereby also resisting the idea that memory embodies self-trust.  Why then 
should we view judgment as an intrapersonal assurance?  The most fundamental reason 
replicates our earlier dialectic, through which we developed the assurance model for testimony.  
We can view these intrapersonal relations with an assurance-theoretic emphasis on conceptual 
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normativity as follows.  By the partial parallel with Elisa’s Cancer, what disables Paula’s 
judgment is her doubt whether the apparent memories informing it are sufficiently reliable to 
serve as the ground of an assurance offered to others.  As we saw in Sections II and III, this 
yields dialectical space for an Evidential Interpretation, on which Elisa and Paula merely register 
their responsiveness to evidence of their unreliability.  We can resist that interpretation with an 
extension of the assurance-theoretic reframing maneuver that we developed in Section IV. 
On such an Assurance Interpretation, the full story of Paula’s affliction must also include 
her fear that a bend in the concept that she expresses with a term like ‘authority’ will prevent 
others from receiving her assurance in trust.  Although she may also be interested in evidence of 
her truth-conducive reliability, which may – as far as the present point goes – be generated as 
conceived by the Evidential Interpretation, she is more fundamentally interested in evidence that 
others use the term without the bend that she fears it may contain.  Her interest in this evidence 
most fundamentally takes the form of her disposition to project an audience of imagined 
interlocutors for her judgment – say, that Gregory is abusing his authority – who will receive the 
testimonial expression of that judgment in trust, by taking her word for it.  This disposition to 
project then runs aground on Paula’s metalinguistic anxieties: what if these others do not believe 
her because they think that, as Gregory’s wife, she has no right to issue such a complaint?  Or 
something like that: her anxiety is amorphous and cannot be reduced to a single propositional 
content.  Formulating it with metalinguistic content, she is anxious that addressees will regard 
the relevant concept of authority as undergoing a ‘bend’ in marriage and therefore will regard 
him, as her husband, as not lacking in authority to challenge her memory judgments in the way 
he has done.  Because she cannot feel confident that this imaginative projection will be 
confirmed by actual testimony she might give – not because there will be no such actual 
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addressees, but because, if there are, they will not react as depicted by the projection – she loses 
confidence in her capacity to form judgments using a term like ‘authority’ in this intended usage.  
Her loss of confidence leaves her just as Gregory wants her: silenced because unable to judge. 
Paula’s case thus goes deeper than Elisa’s cancer or your acrophobia, both of which do 
admit of an Evidential Interpretation, since in each of the latter the subject can be viewed (if one 
wants) as most fundamentally doubting her or your truth-conducive reliability.  We cannot fully 
understand Paula’s case, by contrast, unless we treat her self-doubt as extending to her status as a 
concept-user.  As I’m interpreting the film, Paula does doubt the truth-conducive reliability of 
her memory judgments, but she also, and more fundamentally, doubts the dispositions informing 
her use of some key concepts in the judgments that frame the controversy over those memory 
judgments.  I think it’s better to treat all three cases as containing both dimensions, but it is only 
Paula’s case that forces us to acknowledge the conceptual dimension of self-reflection.  Again, 
we are forced into that interpretation only if we are struck by the aspect of Paula’s predicament 
that I have emphasized: that her pathology of memory appears cured as soon as, and insofar as, 
she feels the force of Brian Cameron’s trusting receptivity to the assurances that she gives him in 
testimony.  (In the film this happens twice.  He leaves her in the final scene, Gregory returns, and 
she relapses into self-doubt.  But Brian’s return as reassuring addressee re-enacts her cure.)  
Paula has worries about her memory as a guide to truth, but her core worry targets her grasp of 
the concepts that inform the judgments that she expresses in this testimony.  When he accepts her 
assurances, she receives reassuring evidence that her grasp is solid. 
This Assurance Interpretation of the intrapersonal case returns us to the topic of Section 
V, since we see here how the two dimensions of doxastic stability marked by Burge’s term 
‘content preservation’ – the purely conceptual dimension and the properly epistemic – fit 
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together.  A focus on the pathological disruption in Paula’s predicament and the non-pathological 
disruption in Elisa’s helps us see how it is far too simple to describe stability as a matter of 
something’s being ‘preserved.’  The stability of belief is a normative accomplishment.  Though 
not itself a speech act, judging that p projects both a possible interpersonal recipient of the act of 
testifying that p and an intrapersonal recipient who will receive the judgment in memory.  This 
intrapersonal recipient is not an addressee, since judgment is not as such a speech act.  But the 
intrapersonal recipient’s responsiveness to evidence of your untrustworthiness as you judge 
constrains your intrapersonal invitation to trust in the way that your beliefs about how an 
addressee will receive it may constrain your testimony.  That is why judgment projects this 
audience.  While the constraint may engage your truth-conducive reliability on the question 
whether p, as you assess your reliability from this addressee’s perspective, it may equally – and 
more fundamentally – engage your capacity to communicate with the addressee through 
exercising a shared repertoire of concepts.  We need an assurance model of judgment and 
memory because we must explain how you monitor your conceptual commitments through 
monitoring your addressees’ receptivity to the assurance that you give them through inviting 
their trust.  The mechanism of this monitoring reveals how we can pursue Socratic reflection in 
the medium of judgment without speech.  While you can pursue Socratic reflection in private, 
the assurance model provides a novel basis for ruling out ‘private language.’  The dynamic of 
assurance and reassurance is inherently communicative.  The intrapersonal role of assurance in 
judgment and memory does its normative work by mimicking its interpersonal role in testimony. 
